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NOTES
REDEMPTION OF PREFERRED SHAREs-The frequent inclusion of a redemption clause in the issuance of preferred stock has been a notable feature of modern corporate financing. In practice, redemption has been generally restricted
to preferred shares I; it is frequently so confined by statute. 2 These clauses are
of various types and often differ according to the exigencies of the investment
market. Their provisions may grant an option either to the corporation or to the
holder to have the shares redeemed, or may simply state that the shares are to be
redeemed on a fixed date. The existence of a definite maturity date or of an
to the
option in the holder is often a source of considerable embarrassment
company by causing a drain of essential funds from a going concern. 3 The use
of the clause has been frequently motivated by a desire on the part of the corporation to eliminate, at a future time when money rates may be lower, the high
fixed charges normally incident to the payment of dividends on cumulative
preferred stock. 4 This advantage would seem to be most effectively attained
by retaining the option in the corporation. From the standpoint of the investor,
a redeemable preferred share, particularly when it carries cumulative dividends,
is attractive because of its resemblance to a bond. The share closely approximates a fixed corporate obligation to pay money when maturity is at the holder's
election or upon the arrival of a specified date. These two types of investments
are practically indistinguishable when the corporation is bound to anticipate the
redemption by establishing a sinking fund.5 It is true that ordinarily there is
no right to institute receivership or bankruptcy proceedings in the event of a
corporation's failure to pay dividends. Even in this respect, however, the usual
distinction between a bond and a share certificate largely disappears; an acceleration of maturity clause in a bond is suggested when the holder of the share may
in terms compel a redemption upon the failure of the corporation to pay dividends for a specified period.6 Because of the anomalous character of this inI. See Jones, Redeemable Corporate Securities (1931) 5 So. CALIF. L. REv. 83. Only
two cases have been discovered in which the redemption of common stock was involved:
Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 Atl. 654 (Ch. 1928) ; Gaehle's
Piano Mfg. Co. v. Berg, 45 Md. 113 (1876).
2. ARx. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 1703; CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930)
§§ 3425, 3451; Du. CORP. LAW (1932) § 13; ME. Rrv. STAT. (193o) c. 56, § 20; MINN.
STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 7470-1; Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) § 4132; NFv. ComP. LAWS (Hillyer,
1929) § 16io; N. J. CoIP. STAT. (Supp. 1930) §§ 47-18, 47-120; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 32-119; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 1156; OKLA. STAT. (Harlow,
1931) § 9775; OpE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 25-224; R. I. Acts 1932, c. 1941, p. 255; VA. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1930) § 3792; WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1932) § 3812; W. VA. CODE
(Michie, 1932) § 3052; Wis. STAT. (1931) § 182-13; 19 &20 GEO. V, c. 23, §46 (1929).
3. See Reagan Bale Co. v. Heuermann, 149 S. W. 228, 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912);
DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (3d rev. ed. 1934) 51-52. Few of the statutes
confine the exercise of the option to the corporation. CA.- Civ. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 347;
19 & 2o GEo. V, c. 23, § 46 (1929).
4. See CONYNGTON AND BENNErr, CORPORATION PRocEDuRE (rev. ed. 1927) 365.
5. In the absence of express provision in the articles of association or by-laws, there
would seem to be no implied obligation to amortize the redemption obligation by means of a
sinking fund, where a corporation engaged in the exploitation of wasting assets paid dividends on its common stock as well as its preferred out of annual profits. Mellon v. Mississippi Wire Glass Co., 77 N. J. Eq. 498, 78 Atl. 710 (Ch. igio).
6. There may possibly be a tendency to restrict the enforcement of such a right to the
failure to pay dividends only in cases where there are funds available for dividends. If such
a provision amounted to a guarantee of dividends regardless of the existence of profits or

earnings, courts would probably construe them to be invalid. Allied Magnet Wire Corp. v.
Tuttle, 199 Ind. 66, 154 N. E. 480 (1926), rehearing denied, 156 N. E. 558 (927).
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NOTES
vestment an inquiry may well be directed into its essential nature and the safeguards which the courts have developed in the interest of corporate creditors
when the holder seeks enforcement of the redemption provision.
I. The Nature of Redemption
The issuance of redeemable preferred shares contemplates a future return
of the certificate to the corporation and a distribution of corporate funds to the
holder. Judicial parlance has often failed to distinguish the process of redemption from other similar processes involving a reacquisition of shares by the corporation and a distribution of funds to its members. Strictly, a right to redeemn
springs from a provision in the articles of association, by-laws or share certificate existing at the time the shares were created and obtaining with respect to
all the shares of a given class. 7 A purchase of shares, on the other hand, though
it also results in a surrender of shares and a distribution of funds to the holder,
is the creature of a specific agreement between the corporation and the individual holder. The obligation of the corporation to purchase does not necessarily
arise at the time of issuance." Redemption, moreover, is not subject to the many
objections that are apparent in the case of a corporation's purchasing its own
shares.9 Redemption is usually provided for in an instrument with which a
certain publicity is connected. The right of redemption exists with respect to
all the shares of a given class. Although there is involved in both a redemption
and a purchase the withdrawal of funds that may be necessary for the successful
prosecution of the business, there is not in the former case the same danger of
prejudicing the rights of prospective investors and creditors that exists in the
case of an isolated purchase, since the statement of the redemption rights in the
articles of association, by-laws or share certificate at least furnishes such persons
an opportunity to become aware of the shareholders' special position.'0 However, since a redemption as well as a purchase may entail particularly harmful
consequences to corporate creditors, courts have been led to declare that the
two processes are identical." On the other hand, where a dissatisfied shareholder seeks to restrain the issuance or the redemption of redeemable shares on
the ground of an alleged violation of a statutory prohibition against a corporation
buying its own shares, the courts have usually succeeded in differentiating the
two transactions.' 2
Another process often involving a delivery of shares to the corporation and
a distribution of capital to the shareholder is a statutory reduction of capital
stock.' 3 This method differs, however, from a redemption in at least one respect. It is not provided for in advance by an agreement between the corporation and its members at the time of the issuance of the shares.
7.

BERLE, CASES AND MATERIALS IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1933)

8. Ibid.

477.

9. The general tenor of these objections is that a purchase results in an unjust discrimination against other shareholders, and that the interests of corporate creditors may be adversely affected by the dissipation of the corporation's assets. They are admirably stated in an
article by Irving J. Levy in (I93O) i5 MINN. L. REV. I.
Io. This reason has particular force in a jurisdiction where those dealin'g with the corporation are charged with notice of the charter or the by-laws. The listing requirements of
most exchanges now require that redemption rights be stated on the stock certificate. Jones,
loc. cit. supra note I, at 87. The prospectus required by the Federal Securities Act of 1933
requires in Schedule A, § 9, a statement of the retirement rights. 48 STAT. 88 (1933), I5 U.
S. C. A. § 77aa (934).
ii. See In re Culbertson's, 54 F. (2d) 753, 76o (C. C.A. 9th, 1932) ; Koeppler v. Crocker
Chair Co., 200 Wis. 476, 481, 228 N. W. 130, 131 (930).
12. Venner v. Public Utilities Commissioner ex reL. Chicago, etc. Ry., 3o Ill. 232, 234
N. E. 17 (1922) (redemption not violative of rule against corporation purchasing its own
stock) ; F. T. Gunther Grocery Co. v. Hazel, 179 Ky. 775, 201 S. W. 336 (1918) (same).
13. Representative statutory provisions are CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1931) §§ 348, 348a,
348b, as amended by Statutes 1931, c.862, p. i8o5; DEx.. CoRP. LAW (1932) § 28.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

The authorities are not clear with respect to the source of the corporation's
authority to redeem its shares. It did not exist in England, in the absence of a
In this country,
special act of Parliament, until the Companies Act of15 1929.'
The inclusion of a reexpress statutory authority seems to be unnecessary.
demption provision in the articles of association or the by-laws usually confers6
sufficient authority on the corporation to issue shares subject to redemption.
Many modern statutes have, nevertheless, expressly conferred the right to
issue redeemable shares and provided for the manner of effectuating the redemption. Whether under statute or otherwise, problems arise with respect to
the funds applicable to redeeming shares and the disposition of the shares after
their acquisition by the corporation.
There is a theory now in disfavor that the corporation's capital is at all
times a trust fund for the satisfaction of the claims of its creditors. It would7
seem to follow that it could not be withdrawn for the redemption of shares.'
Redemption under the English Companies Act of 1929 may only be made from
profits which would otherwise be available for dividend payments or from the
proceeds of new shares expressly issued for the purpose of redeeming outstanding preferred shares.' 8 The modern American rule, however, permits a corfrom capital, provided that the rights of creditors
poration to redeem its shares
20
are not thereby injured. 19 Moreover, statutes now expressly grant this right,
subject to certain limitations noted below. In most of the statutes providing
for redemption from capital, safeguards are imposed for the benefit of creditors
of the corporation. Whether redemption may be effected from capital or only
from surplus, it is generafly prohibited when the corporation is already insolvent, when the act of redemption would make it insolvent, or when, as a result
of the redemption, insolvency would be threatened in the very near future.
For the purpose of determining insolvency most statutes adopt the bankruptcy
test, prohibiting redemption when the corporation's liabilities exceed or would
exceed its assets. 2' Others, however, have applied the equity concept of in14. 19 & 2o GEo. V, c. 23, § 46 (1929).
15. Jones, loc. cit. supra note I, at 87. Contra: ii FLrTcHE, CYCLOPAEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (931) § 5309.
16. See Coggeshall v. Georgia Land & Investment Co., 14 Ga. App. 637, 64o, 8z S. E.
156, 157 (1914) ; Star Publishing Co. v. Ball, 182 Ind. 158, 163-64, 134 N. E. 285, 287-88
(1922) ; Hackett v. Northern Pac. Ry., 36 Misc. 583, 587, 73 N. Y. Supp. 1087, 1090 (Sup.
Ct. 19O) ; Long v. Guelph Lumber Co., 31 Upper Canada C. P. 129, 137 (188o). Contra:
Vercoutere v. Golden State Land Co., 116 Cal. 410, 48 Pac. 375 (1897) ; cf. Civil Service Investment Ass'n v. Thomas, 138 Tenn. 77, 195 S. W. 775 (1917) (redemption clause in a bylaw invalid for failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by statute for the reduction
of capital).
17. Culver v. Reno Real Estate Co., 91 Pa. 367 (1879) ; see Hazel Atlas Co. v. Van Dyke
& Reeves, Inc., 8 F. (2d) 716, 723 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) cert. denied, 269 U. S. 570 (1925) ;
Civil Service Investment Ass'n v. Thomas, 138 Tenn. 77, 8I, 195 S. W. 775, 776 (1917);
BERLE, op. cit. . upra note 7, at 477-478.
18. Ig & 2o GEo. V, c. 23, § 46 (1929).
ig. Westerfield-Bonte Co. v. Burnett, 176 Ky. I88, 195 S. W. 477 (1917) ; see Crimmins
& Peirce Co. v. Kidder Peabody Acceptance Corp., 282 Mass. 367, 376, 185 N. E. 383, 387
(1933) ; cf. Civil Service Investment Ass'n v. Thomas, 138 Tenn. 77, 8I, 195 S. W. 775, 776
(1917).
20. CAL CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 347; DEL. CoRP. LAW (1932) § 27, as amended by
Laws 1932, c. 9, P. 385; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 1125; Mich. Public Acts 1931, No.
327, § 37; N. J. CooP. STAT. (Supp. 1930) 88 47-18, 47-120; OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, 193o) § 8623-39; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1934) tit. 15, § 705; R. I. Acts 1932, C.
1941, p. 255; W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 3052. Contra: NEv. CoMP. LAWS (Hillyer,
1929) § 1624 (only from "capital surplus or other surplus").
21. DEL. CORP. LAW (1932) § 27; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 1125; ME. REv. STAT.
(1930) c. 56, § 20; W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 3052; cf. COLO. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930)
§ 936 ("any impairment of capital") ; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 50 ("prejudice the rights of existing creditors") ; Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) § 4132 ("thereby rendered
insolvent") ; R. I. Acts 1932, c. 1941, p. 255 ("thereby be rendered insolvent, or if capital as
reduced is, or would thereby be, impaired").

NO TES

solvency-inability to discharge liabilities as they mature. 22 The bankruptcy test
of insolvency seems preferable for the purposes of redemption. At the time
of the redemption there may be sufficient assets remaining with which to meet
claims of creditors shortly accruing, but there may be no assurance that such
liabilities may be discharged even in the near future. In addition, the statutes
lay down certain formalities similar to those prescribed for the reduction of a
corporation's capital stock. When shares are redeemed an amendment to the
charter is sometimes required. The filing of a certificate and the approval of an
appropriate official are frequently made necessary. 23 A certain publicity is
may be of benefit to those intending to invest or lend
thereby attained which
2 4
credit in the future.

Although the corporation is not insolvent in either an equity or a bankruptcy sense at the time of the redemption, and will not become so by the redemption, there are certain restrictions designated by the statutes as to the capital
funds that may be withdrawn. In the case of the redemption of par value
shares, the amount of the capital applicable thereto is often confined to the
Where no-par value shares are
aggregate par value of the shares redeemed.
involved, some statutes expressly provide that the amount of capital withdrawable shall be the portion of the capital account represented by such shares, 22 76
or the amount of capital originally received upon the issuance of the shares.
Other statutes state that the amount shall not exceed the agreed redemption price
of the no-par shares.28 Others fail to distinguish between the redemption of
par and no-par value shares, and provide that the corporation may apply an
amount out of its capital not exceeding (i) that part of the consideration originally received for the shares allocated to capital, plus (2) that part of the surplus which
shall have been transferred and treated as capital in respect to such
2
shares.

The redemption clause often provides that preferred shares are redeemable
at a premium, 30 or that the redemption price plus all accrued and unpaid dividends are to be paid to the holder. According to the provisions of several statutes, such premiums or back dividends may be taken only from the surplus
account.3 1 Although these provisions with respect to the application of capital
22.

(Deering, 1931) §347; ILl. ,_Ry.STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 32, § 58;
(Purdon Supp. 1934) tit. 15, § 705. judicial approval of the equity concept

CAL. Civ. CODE

PA. STAT. ANN.

of insolvency for the purpose of redemption has been expressed. See Inscho v. Mid-Continent

Development Co., 94 Kan. 370, 390-91, 146 Pac. 1014, 1021 (1915); Crimmins & Peirce Co.
v. Kidder Peabody Acceptance Corp., 282 Mass. 367, 377, 185 N. E. 383, 387 (1933).
23. The provisions of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law of 1933 may serve as
an example of these requirements. The Act requires a detailed statement concerning the
shares redeemed and the amount of capital, surplus and paid-in surplus remaining after the
redemption. The statement is to be submitted for the approval of the Secretary of State and,
if approved, is to be filed in his office. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1934) tit. I5, § 705.
24. See Levy, loc. cit. supra note 9, at 9-10.
25. CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) §347; N. J. CoMP. STAT. (Supp. 1930) §47-18; 1.
I. Acts J932, c. 1941, p. 255.
26. R. I. Acts 1932, c. 1941, p. 255.
27. N. J. Comp. STAT. (Supp. 193o) § 47-18.
28. CAL. CIv. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 347; OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, 1930)

§ 8623-39.
29. Dr. CORP. LAw (1932)
CODE (Michie, 2932) § 3052.

c. 9, § 385, as amended by Laws 1932, c. 9, P. 385; W. VA.

3o. The payment of a premium of fifteen per cent. has been held not to violate a statute
limiting the payment of dividends on preferred stock to eight per cent. General Investment
Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co., 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 Atl. 244 (1925).
31. CAL CIv. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 347 ("if the cost of such shares exceeds the stated
capital in respect thereof, the excess shall be treated as having been paid out of earned surplus, or if there be no such surplus then existing, out of any other surplus"; LA. GEN. STAT.
(Dart, 1932) § 1125 ("if any premium is necessary or required to be paid in connection with
said purchase or redemption, said premium can only be paid out of surplus").
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to the redemption of shares may have the incidental effect of protecting the interests of creditors, it would seem that their chief tendency is to protect2 other
The
shareholders from a dissipation of the capital funds of the corporation.
fact that the capital of a corporation may be withdrawn by express statutory
authority and distributed to a class of shareholders while the corporation is still
a going concern is indeed at variance with the traditional concept of the capital
account as existing primarily for the purpose of paying the debts of the concern.
Such statutes seem to be in effect a recognition that redeemable shares partake
of many of the incidents of a fixed corporate obligation, which the corporation
should be permitted to discharge in the same manner in which debts are paid,
provided that contract creditors and bondholders are not thereby injured.
A question arises concerning the status of shares that have been redeemed.
Is a redemption equivalent to a reduction of capital, so that the corporation
may pay dividends upon the basis of the readjustment in its capital structure?
Some of the statutes categorically state that the redeemed shares shall have the
redemption
status of authorized but unissued shares.32 Other statutes say that
shall have the effect of a reduction of the corporation's capital,3 4 or that the
shares shall be deemed to be extinguished and the redemption equivalent to a
reduction if the articles of association provide that the shares may not be renot
issued.35 In the absence of an express statutory provision, the courts have
36
been in agreement as to the nature of shares that have been redeemed.
32. Thus, express provision is made in some statutes that the net assets may not be reduced to an amount less than "the aggregate amount payable to the holders of shares having
prior or equal rights to the assets of the corporation upon dissolution." CAL. CIV. CODE
(Deering, ig3i) § 347; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1934) tit. 15, § 705; cf. R. I. Acts
1932, c. 1941, p. 255 ("if the rights of the holders of any class would thereby be violated").
33. CAL. CIv. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 342a, as amended by Statutes 1931, c. 862, pp.
18oo-ol; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 5o; R. I. Acts 1932, c. 1941, p. 255 ("and
shall be subject to all the provisions of the charter or articles with respect to reissue or otherwise") ; TENN. CODE ANN. (Michie, x932) § 3736 ("and other shares may be reissued in lieu
thereof") ; 19 & 2o GEo. V, c. 23, § 46 (3929) ("and share capital shall not be deemed to be
increased for the purposes of any stamp duty").
34. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1934) tit. I5, § 705 ("and the stated capital shall be
deemed to be reduced to this extent") ; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932)' § 1125 (when the redemption is made out of "capital or borrowed money") ; ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 32,
§ 58. It is possible, however, that under the Illinois act the shares may have the status of
authorized but unissued shares, since provision is made for reduction of stated capital only
when the articles of association state that the shares redeemed "shall be cancelled and shall
not be reissued". The possibility of their acquiring the status of authorized but unissued
shares is not expressly excluded. This feature of the statute has been criticized, however, in
Ballantine, A CriticalSurvey of the Illinois Business CorporationAct (3934) I U. OF CHI.
L. REv. 357, 374.
35. Mich. Pub. Acts 1931, No. 327, § 37; OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, 1930)
§ 8623-39; DEL. CORP. LAW (1932) § 27, as amended by Laws 1932, c. 9, P. 385 (when the
redemption is made out of capital) ; CAr CIv. CODE (Deering, ig31) § 342a, as amended by
Statutes 1931, c. 862, pp. 18oo-oi (when acquired out of "stated capital", the board of directors may effect a reduction in respect to the shares redeemed. But when redemption has
been made from "earned surplus", the act is conflicting with respect to whether proceedings
under the reduction provision of the statute are necessary, or whether after such shares have
been "carried as treasury shares", they may be retired by mere resolution of the board of

directors).
36. That redemption is a reduction: Civil Service Investment Ass'n v. Thomas, 138 Tenn.
77, 195 S. W. 775 (3917), .rpranote 16; see Hildreth v. Western Realty Co., 62 N. D. 233,
246-247, 242 N. W. 679, 683 (1932) ; Wetherill v. Arasapha Mfg. Co., 24 Pa. Dist. 1045,
3048 (1915) ; In re De Decido Pier Co., [3891] 2 Ch. 354, 358-59. That it is not: Hackett
v. Northern Pac. Ry., 36 Misc. 583, 73 N. Y. Supp. 3087 (Sup. Ct. 19Ol) ; see Weidenfeld v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 129 Fed. 305, 309 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o4) ; Mannington v. Hocking Valley
Ry., 183 Fed. 133, 142 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 191o) ; In re Culbertsor's, 54 F. (2d) 753, 758-59
(C. C. A. 9th, 1932).

NOTES
1I. Where the Enforcement of the Redemption Provision Would Conflict With
the Rights of Creditors
Although a redeemable preferred share resembles in many respects a direct
corporate liability, its enforcement has been consistently subordinated by the
courts to the rights of creditors of the corporation. This is true although the
corporation is nbt in the process of liquidation, and although the exact state
of the corporation's finances does not appear.8 7 In their desire to protect creditors, courts have assumed the likelihood of injury to them from the mere inabilfund out of net
ity of the corporation to pay dividends3s or to establish a sinking
earnings required by the terms of the redemption provision.3 9
The language of the court in Coggeshall v.GeorgiaLand & Investnent Co.
is illustrative of the judicial protection of the rights of creditors:
"For aught that appears in the petition of the plaintiff, the defendant
corporation has no assets other than its capital stock, and may owe debts
equal to or exceeding the amount of such capital stock . . . . No withdrawal from the capital of a corporation can be effected by a preferred
shareholder, unless it appear there are no outstanding creditors whose interest might be adversely affected thereby . . . ; since such a withdrawal
would be manifestly against public policy ... "40
It is axiomatic that the claims of shareholders to the corporate assets are
inferior to those of creditors. The existence of a redemption clause in a preferred share certificate should not entitle the holder to equality with contract
creditors and bondholders upon a liquidation of the corporate assets. However,
even before the occurrence of the conditions which are expressly prerequisite
to a redemption, holders of such shares have frequently attempted to claim the
rights of a creditor, 41 either in a suit against the corporation to compel redemption or upon a distribution of the assets upon insolvency. Such attempts have
almost invariably been frustrated. 42 In denying such claims, the courts adopt
the technique of examining the terms of the articles of association, the by-laws
or the share certificate, in order to determine whether the incidents of proprietor37. Rider v. John G. Delker & Sons Co., 145 Ky. 634, 140 S.W. Ioli (911); Booth v.
i42 Minn. 127, 171 N. W. 307 (919) ;
Wetherill v. Arasapha Mfg. Co., 24 Pa. Dist. 1045 (915) ; Koeppler v. Crocker Chair Co.,
Conversely, when it is made to appear that the rights
200 Wis. 476, 228 N. W. 130 (930).
Union Fibre Co., 137 Minn. 7, 162 N. W. 677 (97),

of creditors will not be prejudiced, enforcement has followed. Cring v. Sheller Wood Rim
Mfg. Co., 183 N. E. 674 (Ind. App. 1932), (1933) 17 MARQ.L. REv. 229; see Mannington v.
Hocking Valley Ry., 183 Fed. 133 (C. C. S. D. Ohio i91o).
38. See Smith v. Southern Foundry Co., 166 Ky. 208, 179 S. W. 205 (1915) ; Kidd v.
Puritana Cereal Food Co., 145 Mo. App. 5o2, 122 S.W. 784 (9o9).
39. Booth v. Union Fibre Co., i37 Minn. 7, i62 N. W. 677 (917), 142 Minn. 127, 171 N.
NV. 307 (1919).

40. 14 Ga. App. 637, 643, 82 S.E. I56, 159 (914).
41. If a debt were created, the transaction might frequently be subject to the objection

of usury. See Ellington v. Raleigh Bldg. Supply Co., 896 N. C. 784, 790, 147 S.E. 307, 380
(1929).

42. Ellsworth v. Lyons, 181 Fed. 55 (C. C. A. 6th, igiO) ; Spencer v. Smith, 2oi Fed.
647 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912) ; Armstrong v. Union Trust & Savings Bank, 248 Fed. 268 (C. C. A.
9th, 1918) ; Jefferson Banking Co. v. Trustees of Martin Inst., 146 Ga. 383, 91 S.E. 463

(917) ; Gressinger v. Massey Hardware Co., 139 Kan. 782, 33 P. (2d) 128 (I934); Ellington v. Raleigh Bldg. Supply Co., 196 N. C. 784, 147 S.E. 307 (1929). Contra: Heider v.
Hermarn Sons Hall Ass'n, 186 Minn. 494, 243 N. W. 699 (1932); cf. Rowan v. Texas
Orchard Development Co., 18, S. W. 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915, 1916) (where creditors had

expressly consented to priority of the redemption rights of the preferred shareholders at the
time they extended credit to the corporation). An early Ohio case held that the certificate
constituted the holder a creditor, because it created none of the rights and imposed none of

the liabilities of a shareholder, i. e., the right to vote or the liability for debts of the corporation. At that time such liability was imposed upon shareholders by the state constitution.
Burt v. Rattle, 38 Ohio St. 116 (1876).
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ship or those of a debt predominate. It may be said that generally any and all
doubts will be resolved in favor of a conclusion that the certificate does not
constitute the holder a creditor.4 3 Particularly when the rights of creditors are
involved, courts are likely to regard with suspicion investment devices which
44
attempt to grant the holder the advantages of both a creditor and a shareholder.
This incentive is lacking, however, when the rights of creditors are not involved,
and the court is concerned with an overissue and the respective rights of transferor and transferee of the certificate. In such a case, the certificate has been
termed a debt and not a share.45
Theoretically, upon the maturity of the corporation's redemption obligation, it would appear that the incidents of shareholdership cease and that the
46
holder automatically becomes a creditor until the price of the shares is paid.
There is, unfortunately, little case authority available with respect to the problem
of the precise time at which shareholdership terminates and the incidents of a
debt arise. Ordinarily, the holder of a redeemable share remains a shareholder
until both he and the corporation have complied with the terms of the redemption clause.4 7 However, when the holder does not receive the redemption price
at the time of the redemption date, the cases are not clear with respect to whether
enforcement shall depend upon solvency at the time the redemption date was
reached,4" or upon solvency at the time that enforcement is actually sought.
There are only two cases in which direct reference is made to the fact of coras grounds for allowing
porate solvency at the arrival of the redemption date
a later recovery when the corporation is insolvent. 49 In one of these cases, all
to the time that
the creditors of the insolvent concern became such subsequent
the holder was entitled to a redemption of his shares. 50 In addition, the results
the redemption date the
in both may have been influenced by the fact that on
52
It is therefore obvious
holder accepted either a mortgage bond 51 or a note.
that a status was acquired by the holder patently inconsistent with prior standbecame a creditor upon
ing as a shareholder. A third case held that the holder
his demand for payment after the redemption date,5 3 although there is no indication of the liquid state of the corporate finances at either time. The results
in all three cases may well have been influenced by the fact that there was some
act on the part of either the shareholder or the corporation definitely repudiating further continuance of the relationship of shareholder. In two other cases,
the holder was permitted to recover the price of his shares subsequent to the
arrival of the redemption date, on the theory that his so-called preferred share
43. The judicial attitude is aptly expressed by the following statement: "[it is the] rule
of construction that an instrument having [many attributes and qualities commonly attaching
to preferred stock as such] will, when the rights of creditors are involved, be construed as
stock unless it clearly appears that a different intention was present in the mind of the contracting parties." See In re Hicks-Fuller Co., 9 F. (2d) 492, 494 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) ; Note
(1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 65, 66.
44. Note (1927) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 8o, 81; Note (1928) 28 Coi L. REv. 65, 66.
45. Wright v. Johnson, 183 Iowa 807, 167 N. W. 68o (1918).
46. Gaehle's Piano Mfg. Co. v. Berg, 45 Md. 113 (1876) ; see Hackett v. Northern Pac.
Ry., 36 Misc. 583, 587, 73 N. Y. Supp. lO87, IO9O (Sup. Ct. igoi).
47. Gaston v. Kidder Peabody Acceptance Corp., 189 N. E. 78 (Mass. 1934) ; Matter of
Colby v. Imbrie & Co., 126 Misc. 457, 214 N. Y. Supp. 53 (Sup. Ct. 1926), aft'd, 216 App.
Div. 713, 214 N. Y. Supp. 819 (Ist Dep't 1926) ; cf. Inscho v. Mid-Continent Development
Co., 94 Kan. 370, 146 Pac. 1014 (1915) ; see Corbett v. McClintic-Marshall Corp., 17 Del. Ch.
165, 170, 151 Atl. 218, 221 (Ch. 193o).
48. See (193o) 28 MIcH. L. REv. 764, 765.
49. Totten & Co. v. Tison, 54 Ga. 139 (1875) ; Campbell v. Grant Trust & Savings Co.,
782 N. E. 267 (Ind. App. 1932), (933) 8 IND. L. J. 442.
50. Campbell v. Grant Trust & Savings Co., 182 N. E. 267 (Ind. App. 1932).
51. Totten & Co. v. Tison, 54 Ga. 139 (1875).
52. Campbell v. Grant Trust & Savings Co., 182 N. E. 267 (Ind. App. 1932).
53. Allen v. Northwestern Mfg. Co., 189 Iowa 731, 179 N. W. 130 (1920).

NO TES

certificate constituted a debt of the corporation.5 This conclusion was reached
despite the fact that the evidence pointed to financial embarrassment both at
the time of the redemption date and of the suit for the enforcement of the
provision.
On the other hand, when the holder seeks the price of his shares after the
redemption date has passed, he has frequently been unable to recover when the
corporation is subsequently insolvent, although there is no indication of the actual
state of the corporation's finances at the redemption date.55 Because of this
absence of any evidence as to the financial position at that time, it is not improbable that the basis for the denial of the redemption rights was the existence
of insolvency at the time of attempted enforcement, and that the arrival of the
redemption date did not ipso facto convert the holder into a creditor. The language of the court in Vanden Bosch v. Michigan Trust Co. is significant:
"We see no basis for thinking that the mere arrival of the maturity
date can work any magic change in the cliaracter of the relationship . . .
"Thinking as we do that claimant's transmutation from stockholder
to creditor was not completed merely by the hand of the clock, we do not
consider what her rights would have been if she had, before receivership,
recovered judgment, or even brought suit, affirmatively repudiating longer
tolerance of her ostensible position." 5B
It is difficult, however, to understand why the court placed operative importance on the commencement of suit or the recovery of judgment prior to the
institution of the receivership. The fact of having started suit does not improve
one's position as a creditor. Neither fact should of itself determine the right
of the holder of a redeemable share to stand as a creditor upon liquidation. Despite the reasoning of the court, there was every good reason to deny the holder's
claim. At the time the corporation's obligation to redeem matured, it would
have been difficult for the corporation to have withdrawn the necessary funds,
and for that reason a majority of the preferred shareholders agreed to accept in
exchange a new issue of preferred shares with a postponed redemption date. In
the second place, the claimant had, subsequent to the redemption date, accepted
a dividend on her preferred shares-an act obviously inconsistent with her contention that she became a creditor upon the arrival of the redemption date. And
finally, the corporation was insolvent when payment of the redemption price
was sought. Another recent case has placed similar importance on the failure
of the holder to start suit or obtain judgment prior to the receivership proceedings. 57 The reasoning of the Vanden Bosch case was applied. Since both of
the cases were decided by the same federal circuit court of appeals, there has
not as yet been widespread judicial reliance on the fact of starting suit or recovering judgment prior to receivership as a basis for defeating the holder's rights.
Provision is often made upon the creation of redeemable preferred shares
for a sinking fund or for a lien on some part or all of the corporate assets as
security for the obligation to redeem. At least where the rights of creditors are
54. Savannah Real Estate, etc. Co. v. Silverberg, io8 Ga.

281,

33 S.E. 908 (18gg) ; Best

v. Oklahoma Mill Co., 124 Okla. 135, 253 Pac. Ioos (1926).

55. Armstrong v. Union Trust & Savings Bank, 248 Fed. 268 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918) ; Hazel
Atlas Co. v. Van Dyk & Reeves, Inc., 8 F. (2d) 716 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925), cert. denied, 269
U. S.570 (1925) ; In re Hicks-Fuller Co., 9 F. (2d) 492 (C. C. A. 8th, 925) ; Smith v.
Southern Foundry Co., 166 Ky. 208, 179 S. W. 205 (1915); Booth v. Union Fibre Co., 137
Minn.7, 162 N. W. 677 (1917), 142 Minn. 127, 171 N. W. 3o7 (1919); Hewitt v. Linnhaven
Orchard Co., go Ore. 1,174 Pac. 616 (1918) ; Warren v. Queen & Co., 240 Pa. 154, 87 AtI.
595 (1913) ; Reagan Bale Co. v. Heuermarn, 149 S. W. 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) ; Koeppler v. Crocker Chair Co., 200 Wis. 476, 228 N. W. 130 (1930).
56. 35 F. (2d) 643, 645 (C. C. A. 6th, i929), (193o) 30 Co. L. REv. 570; (1930) 28

MicHr. L. Rav. 764.
57. Mathews v. Bradford, 7o F.

(2d)

77 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934).
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concerned, the inclusion of such a provision has generally been held to be ineffective to improve the certificate holder's position.5 s The suspicion of the courts
toward investments in which the rights of both an enterpriser and a creditor
are combined is a material factor militating against the holder's claim to superiority over creditors in a distribution of the corporate assets.
With respect to the conflicting rights of creditors and holders of redeemable preferred shares upon a liquidation of the corporation's assets, the question
may arise whether any significance is to be placed upon the time at which parties extended credit to the corporation. Creditors becoming such after redemption have no cause for complaint, 9 since they may well be considered as having
extended credit on the basis of the shares outstanding at the time. Accordingly, when the redemption date fell in a period of corporate solvency, and the
holder sought to obtain the price of his shares in the subsequent insolvency proceedings in a contest with creditors who became such after the redemption date,
it was held that the erstwhile shareholder could compete with such creditors.6 0
On the other hand, the mere fact that parties became creditors subsequent to
the issuance of, but before the redemption of, redeemable preferred shares
secured by a mortgage on the corporate property will not impair their prior
equity upon the liquidation of the corporation. 61 Similarly, where a sinking fund
is provided for the ultimate redemption of the shares, the fact that creditors
did not rely on it as a corporate asset in lending credit to the corporation62 will
not curtail their rights thereto upon subsequent bankruptcy proceedings.
The fact that those extending credit to the corporation are at the time aware
of the redemption rights of the preferred shares should not alter in any way
their standing as creditors.68 However, in two of the few cases presenting the
problem of knowledge this result was not reached. In one of these, the notification by the holder to a party about to extend credit that his shares were redeemable on a definite date in the future would seem to have been the basis for
granting the holder priority over the creditor upon liquidation."4 The opinion,
however, was concerned chiefly with spelling out the attributes of a debt from
the so-called preferred share certificate. The conclusion that the share constituted in fact a definite obligation to pay money was doubtlessly influenced by the
fact of such notice to the prospective creditor. 65 In the other case, where vendor
creditors expressly assented, at the time of extending credit, to the priority of
the redeemable preferred shares, their rights were subordinated to those of the
holders upon subsequent insolvency proceedings.6" However, unless there are
such special circumstances present, the fact of knowledge by the creditor of the
redemption rights of the preferred shareholders should ordinarily be ineffective
to impair the former's superior equity in the corporate assets.
Finally, with respect to the conflicting rights of holders of redeemable
shares and creditors, there remains the question of a recovery by the receiver
58. Ellsworth v. Lyons, 181 Fed. 55 (C. C. A. 6th, 191o) ; Jefferson Banking Co. v.
Trustees of Martin Inst., 146 Ga. 383, 91 S. E. 463 (1917) ; Inscho v. Mid-Continent Development Co., 94 Kan. 370, 146 Pac. 1014 (1915) ; Smith v. Southern Foundry Co., 166 Ky.
2o8, 179 S. W. 205 (1915) ; Ellington v. Raleigh Bldg. Supply Co., 196 N. C. 784, 147 S. E.
307 (1929); Hewitt v. Linnhaven Orchard Co., 90 Ore. I, 174 Pac. 616 (igi8) ; cf. Burt v.
Rattle, 31 Ohio St. 116 (1876), supra note 42.
59. See Mannington v. Hocking Valley Ry., 183 Fed. 133, 146 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 191o).
6o. Campbell v. Grant Trust & Savings Co., 182 N. E. 267 (Ind. App. 1932).
61. Ellington v. Raleigh Bldg. Supply Co., 196 N. C. 784, 147 S. E. 307 (1929).
62. Ellsworth v. Lyons, 181 Fed. 55 (C. C. A. 6th, 191o).
63. Hazel Atlas Co. v. Van Dyk & Reeves, Inc., 8 F. (2d) 716 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925), cert.
denied, 269 U. S.570 (1925).
64. Best v. Oklahoma Mill Co., 124 Okla. 135, 253 Pac. l005 (1926).
65. Id. at 140, 253 Pac. at 1009.
66. Rowan v. Texas Orchard Development Co., 181 S. W. 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 19,5,
1916).
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or trustee in bankruptcy of funds which have been irregularly paid to the holders in redeeming their shares. Because of the almost complete lack of authority
upon this particular phase, it is necessary to resort to analogy. If the distribution of the corporate funds occurred at a time when the corporation was insolvent, or if it was rendered so by the redemption, there might be a recovery of the
funds on the analogy to a recovery of funds irregularly paid as dividends to
stockholders.6 7 In addition, liability might be imposed on the directors for
authorizing such an irregular distribution of capital. Where the irregularity
of the redemption has injured a particular group of stockholders, the courts
would probably allow a recovery at their behest.68
Conclusion
the issuance of redeemable preferred
financing,
of
corporate
a
method
As
shares would seem to be objectionable for at least two reasons. In the first
place, the right of the holder to have his shares redeemed, either upon the arrival
of a definite maturity date or by himself exercising the option, has been conwithsidered by the court to be a right not subject to alteration or postponement
69
The
out his consent, even by an amendment to the articles of association.
pendency of a redemption maturity often embarrasses the corporation's credit
position. Parties may frequently be reluctant to extend essential credit when
they know that a portion of the company's capital or surplus will be withdrawn
in the future for the purpose of redeeming shares. Nevertheless, short of a
on his redempsituation where the corporation is insolvent, the holder may insist
70
On the other
tion rights as they existed at the time his shares were created.
hand, the redemption at the corportion's option may in some cases improve its
credit standing by eliminating the fixed charges so often imposed on earnings
by cumulative preferred shares.7 1 Such an advantage, however, should not outweigh the frequently greater disadvantage of withdrawing funds often vital to
a successful continuation of the business.
In the second place, prospective purchasers of redeemable preferred shares
should be informed that the enforcement of the redemption clause is subject to
the superior equity of corporate creditors. The holder of a redeemable preferred certificate, which may include the features of cumulative dividends, a
fixed maturity date, a sinking fund or a lien or mortgage on the company's
assets, or some combination of them, may often be led to believe that he is in
the position of a bondholder. Amendments to existing Blue Sky Laws or even
Securities Act requiring such notification would seem to be deto the Federal
72
sirable.

I. M.,$Jr.

67. Butler v. Beach, 82 Conn. 417, 74 Atl. 748 (igog).
68. See Vanden Bosch v. Michigan Trust Co., 35 F. (2d) 643, 645 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929).
69. Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D. R. I. 1g29); see
Vanden Bosch v. Michigan Trust Co., 35 F. (2d) 643, 645-46 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929) ; Koeppler
v. Crocker Chair Co., 2oo Wis. 476, 479, 228 N. W. 130, 131 (1930). When the statute under
which the corporation was formed provided that all amendments td the statute should be a
part of the charter of every corporation formed thereunder, and a future amendment to the
statute permitted the type of charter amendment attacked, the holder of preferred shares
could not complain of a charter amendment affecting his redemption rights. Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (Ch. 1923) (amendment abrogating redemption rights) ; Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 Atl. 654 (Ch.
1928) (amendment changing price at which preferred shares were redeemable).
70. See Vanden Bosch v. Michigan Trust Co., 35 F. (2d) 643, 645-46 (C. C. A. 6th,
1929) ; Koeppler v. Crocker Chair Co., 20o Wis. 476, 479, 228 N. W. 130, 131 (1930).
71. See CONYNG'rON AND BENNETr, op. cit. supra note 4.
72. See Koeppler v. Crocker Chair Co., 200 Wis. 476, 483-84, 228 N. W. 130, 132-33
(1930).
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EQUITIES OF THIRD PARTIES AFFECTING APPLICATION OF PAYMENTSWhere a debtor owes two or more separate obligations running to the same
creditor and makes a payment without specifying which debt is to be thereby
discharged, the usual statement is that the creditor has the option of applying it
as he chooses.' In situations involving the rights of third parties, this proposition is subject to various exceptions. It is the purpose of this note to inquire
into the confused state of the law in two of the more frequently recurring of
these situations: (I) where a building contractor pays over funds received from
the owner to subcontractors or materialmen, who apply the funds to prior debts
of the contractor and later bring lien proceedings against the owner's property;
and (2) where a debtor pays to his creditor funds received in the transaction for
which a surety is liable, and subsequently the creditor sues the surety after
applying the funds to other obligations of the debtor.
The basic principles of the law of application of payments have become
firmly established, however the courts may be at odds on the refinements here
under discussion. The debtor may direct the application of his payment in any
way, and the creditor will not be allowed to disregard these instructions.' This
is true even when the direction is to apply to an illegal claim,3 thereby prejudicing
those who may become secondarily liable on other, legal claims of the debtor,
or when the debtor is under a duty to appropriate the funds otherwise than he
directs.4 Of course, the creditor may refuse to accept the payment,5 but if he
accepts, no application other than that specified will bind the debtor.
As stated above, when the debtor fails to direct the application either expressly or by implication, the creditor is ordinarily privileged to apply the payment as he sees fit. And in the event that neither debtor nor creditor exercises
his privilege, 6 the court will do so, and will ordinarily apply the payments to
interest in preference to principal,7 to unsecured rather than to secured debts,8
and to those prior rather than subsequent in time. 9 When the court has
the application to make, equities of third parties are considered,'0 and likewise
the creditor's right to apply is subject to limitations dictated by a similar policy.
As to what constitute sufficient equities of third parties the courts differ, and it
is this problem which invites an inspection of the decisions.
I. MUNGER, APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS (0879) 32; 3 WILISTON, CONTRACTS (1922)

§ 1796 and cases cited.
Id. at § I795 and cases cited.
3. Shannon Co. v. Redman, 189 Mo. App. 477, 176 S. W. 1074 (1915) ; Lauten v. Rowan,
59 N. H. 215 (1879).
4. 3 WnusTON, CONTRACTS (1922) § 1795. As where the debtor is using trust money,
or is under a contractual duty to a third party (e. g., the surety or the owner) to direct application in a certain manner. But see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 388 for a limitation on this power when the creditor knows the source of the funds.
2.

5. 3 WIuISTON, CONTRACTS (1922)

§

1795.

6. The debtor's right to direct the application ceases as soon as payment is made. 3 WitLISTON, CONTRACTS (1922)

§ 1796. There are varying rules as to the length of time that will

be given the creditor to exercise his privilege, although it is certain that he must do so before
bringing an action. Id. at § 1798.
7. Harlan v. Houston, 258 Fed. 61i (C. C. A. 8th, 1919) ; Dean v. Williams, 17 Mass.
417 (1821) ; MUNGER, op. cit. suprG note I, at 126.
8. Delaware Dredging Co. v. Tucker Co., 25 F. (2d) 44 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928) ; Barbee v.
Morris, 221 Ill. 382, 77 N. E. 589 (i9o6). This is in accordance with the common law rule
that in the absence of application by either party, the law will make such application as will
inure to the creditor's benefit; in jurisdictions following the civil law rule favoring the debtor's
interests, the payment is made to secured debts first. New Orleans Ins. Co. v. Tio, 15 La.
Ann. 174 (I86O) ; Sunflower County v. Bank of Drew, 136 Miss. 191, ioi So. 192 (I924).
The great majority of jurisdictions adopt the former rule.
9. Hollister v. Davis, 54 Pa. 5o8 (1867) ; Devaynes v. Noble, I Meriv. 529, 572 (Ch.
x816) (generally cited as "Clayton's Case") ; MUNGER, op. cit. supra note I, at 102.
io. First Nat. Bank v. National Surety Co., 13o Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 6th, z9o4).

NOTES
Lien Cases
When an owner makes payment to his contractor sufficient to cover
charges for labor and materials, and later is compelled to pay again in order
to satisfy a mechanic's lien for the same obligations, it may readily be acknowledged that he has an understandable grievance. As was said in a frequentlycited case:
". .. the law will make the credit according to principles of justice and
equity. It will not permit the money of one man to be used in the payment
of the debt of another man, or declare a lien on the property of the man
who has paid in full for all the material furnished to improve his property." 21
As will subsequently be seen, the merits of the controversy are not all with
the owner. Nevertheless, the majority of courts have in this situation seen fit
to deny the effectiveness of an application by the materialman to other debts, at
least where knowledge of the source of the funds on the part of the materialman
is shown. 12 Some go so far as to protect the owner even though there was no
such knowldge. 1" On the other hand, there are a few decisions upholding the
materialman's freedom of application even with knowledge,'- and a respectable
number of jurisdictions in which the owner will lose unless knowledge is shown.1 5
In almost all the opinions there is noticeable a singular lack of discussion of the
bases for the distinctions made. It is not immediately apparent, when viewing
the problem with an eye to practical justice, why knowledge on the part of the
materialman should be so vital a factor. More compelling would seem to be the
likelihood of actual damage to one or the other party in the event of an adverse
decision. Thus it might be pointed out that the materialman, even without knowledge of the source of the funds, will in many cases really suffer no more than the
annoyance of a transfer on his books, and will receive the full benefit of the
payment in either event. It is true that his position may be less advantageous
than that which he had temporarily assumed, as where he had purported to
discharge an obligation precarious because without security. If required to reopen that debt and discharge the one with a lien for security, he will have left
an uncertain rather than a comparatively safe debt. Nevertheless, without more
than this in the way of damage, the net result of the transaction is nothing of
which he should be heard to complain; now, as before the payment was made,
he has open the unsecured obligation, and in place of a secured debt, he has full
payment.
ii.

(19o9).

Williams v. Willingham-Tift Lumber Co., 5 Ga. App. 533, 536, 63 S. E. 584, 585

12. Kubatzky v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., iig Okla. 236, 249 Pac. 412 (1926) ; Hughes
v. Flint, 61 Wash. 46o, 112 Pac. 633 (1gI); Farr v. Weaver, 84 W. Va. 182, 99 S. E. 395
(1919). Compare with the surety cases, subsequently discussed, where there is a considerable
body of opinion in favor of the view that even a nmaterialman with knowledge has freedom
of application.
13. Williams v. Willingham-Tift Lumber Co., 5 Ga. App. 533, 63 S. E. 584 (1909) ; Clow
& Sons v. Goldstein, 147 Ill. App. 57, (1909) ; Sioux City Foundry Co. v. Merten, 174 Iowa
332,

156 N. W. 367 (1916).

14. Grace Harbor Lumber Co. v. Ortman, 19o Mich. 429, 157 N. W. 96 (1916) ; Jefferson v. Church of St. Matthew, 41 Minn. 392, 43 N. W. 74 (1889).
15. Brigham v. DeWald, 7 Ind. App. 115, 34 N. E. 498 (1893); First Presbyterian
Church v. Santy, 52 Kan. 462, 34 Pac. 974 (1893) ; Thacker v. Bullock Lumber Co., 14o Ky.
463, 131 S. W. 271 (1io). In Bohn v. Wilson, 53 Ore. 490, IO0Pac. 202 (Io9), even though
there had been an agreement between the owner and the contractor to discharge the obligations in question, the materialman's lien was upheld when it was not shown that he had knowledge of the agreement or of the source of the funds. See Notes (1926) 41 A. L. R. 1297;
L. R. A. i9i6D 1254, for a collection of cases illustrating the different views.
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He may, however, have placed himself in a position from which retraction
will entail inevitable loss. Thus he may have released security on other obligations, or, lulled by the belief that the prior debts were properly discharged,
he may, if forced to retract that application, find that the Statute of Limitations
has shut the door to suit on the earlier claims. In any case, the expense of a
futile suit to establish a lien against the owner's property is burdensome. In
acting so as to lay himself open to such consequences he is governed by a not
unreasonable belief. Money paid by the owner to the contractor may well be
considered by the materialman as the contractor's own, free from restrictions as
to its use. Payment with it may accordingly be regarded as applicable to any
outstanding debts, in the absence of directions. 6 Any injury to the owner may
be traced to his own failure to safeguard his interests by notifying the materialman of the facts.17 If it be argued that a materialman who contemplates the
assertion of liens should ascertain and take cognizance of the source of the funds
with which he is paid, it has been pointed out in answer that it would be highly
inappropriate, as
a matter of business tact, for him to question the contractor as
8
to that source.'

On the other hand, there can be no question of the injury to the owner.
Success for the materialman in his lien proceedings, knowledge or no knowledge,
will mean that the owner pays twice. Particularly if he be a layman engaging
the contractor for an isolated building job, he may be less conversant with the
lurking dangers of a lien proceeding than those with whom he deals. It certainly seems that unless the materialman has in some manner become susceptible
to serious damage on the failure of his lien, the owner should be protected.
Evidence of this feeling may be obtained from statutes that exist in about onethird of the states providing that full payment to the contractor will be a sufficient defense for the owner against subsequent lien proceedings. "9
In defense of the practice of those courts which make knowledge of the materialman the controlling factor, it may be conceded that it is a natural tendency,
here as elsewhere in the law, to treat the unknowing with greater tenderness than
those whose actions are accompanied by an awareness of the surrounding circumstances. However, the importance of innocence as compared to actual damage appears to have been unduly magnified. A change in approach so as to
make likelihood of damage, rather than knowledge, the test, would involve possible difficulties of determining what degree of harm to the materialman would
outweigh the considerations favoring the owner. Such difficulties seem insufficient to constitute an insuperable bar to an otherwise advisable transition. In
view, however, of the consistency with which many courts have in the past
adhered to the view that knowledge is determinative, it is perhaps optimistic to
expect a widespread shift in the proposed direction. As to what constitutes this
knowledge which plays such an important role, all that can be said is that the
question is one of fact, and as such is for determination by the jury. Where the
owner's check is endorsed over to the materialman, it is relatively clear that he
is put on notice of its source,2" as is 2the
case if the owner undertakes to make
1
payment directly to the materialman.
i6. Jefferson v. Church of St. Matthew, 41 Minn. 392, 393, 43 N. W. 74, 75 (1889).
17. Grace Harbor Lumber Co. v. Ortman, igo Mich. 429, 439, 157 N. W. 96,99 (1916).

i8. "Under the decision of the majority . . . he must, before accepting a payment, inquire where his debtor received the money. This would ordinarily be deemed an impertinence
at best. . . ." Rudkin, J., dissenting in Columbia Digger Co. v. Sparks, 227 Fed. 780, 787
(C. C. A. 9th, i9,5). This was a case involving a surety, but on this point the considerations are the same.
ig. E. g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 51o8; IL.. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 82, § 21;
N. Y.LIEN LAW (1909) § 4.
20. Fawkes v. Curtis, 133 Ore. 2o, 286 Pac. 98i (930) ; Harris v. Gilbert, 46 R. I. 350,
128 Atl. ii (925).
21. As in Bowen v.Desser, 179 Cal. 322, 176 Pac. 453 (i918).

NOTES
Surety Cases
Where, instead of lien proceedings against the owner's property, the action
is against a surety on the contractor's bond,2 2 different considerations arise,
although the situations are in many respects analogous. Perhaps the greatest
difference is that the professional surety's business is inherently one of risk, for
which compensation is received. Accordingly, it will be seen that the courts
have fewer qualms about imposing an obligation upon him than about enforcing
a double payment on the owner in the lien cases. However, where the funds
have been supplied by or secured with the assistance of the surety, he is generally
accorded protection. 23 In such a case he is in an even worse position than the
owner who pays twice in the lien actions, since if the surety pays twice it represents a greater disparity from his original prospect of possibly paying once than
is the case with the owner, who counted on paying once in any event. Another
situation in which the result is easily reached is that in which the funds are
secured by the contractor from sources unconnected with the transaction on
which the surety's obligation rests. It is well settled that the mere existence
of a surety on one obligation will not compel application by the creditor to that
debt in preference to others. 24 The disagreement in the cases arises where the
funds paid are those accruing from the transaction for which the surety is liable.
It has been stated that the creditor is bound to make such application as will
release the surety "where the creditor receives from the principal [debtor], the
very thing that the surety guaranteed that the principal would deliver." 25 This
type of statement is not illuminating. If the surety merely guarantees that the
debtor will turn over specific goods or funds, then of course this obligation is
fulfilled when they reach the hands of the creditor, and his subsequent application
is immaterial. But in the usual case, and it is to this that the writer of the above
statement apparently refers, the surety is not automatically discharged by the
mere payment to the materialman or other creditor; he guarantees the satisfaction
of obligations, not the mere physical transfer of specific property. It will be seen
that in such a situation, the decisions do not warrant the statement of so flat a rule
of law.
Here, as in the lien cases, the factor of knowledge or notice to the creditor
plays an important part. The favor with which the law is often said to treat
sureties is nowhere more'apparent than in the cases holding ineffective an application of payments by a creditor with no knowledge of the source of the money. "6
As the owner was favored in the analogous lien cases, here entire stress is laid
upon the equities favoring the surety. 27 There is, it is true, something to be
said for this view. The debtor's performance on a certain transaction is guaranteed by the surety, and, the debtor having made payment, the surety's protest
at being made party defendant in a subsequent suit by the creditor, who has
22. Statutory requirement of such bonds, with sureties, is common. For a discussion of
the extent and interpretation of such statutes, see Note (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 572.
23. Bayer v. Lugar, io6 App. Div. 522, 94 N. Y. Supp. 8o2 (1st Dep't 1905), aff'd, 186
N. Y. 569, 79 N. E. IOO (19o6). Interesting variations, not within the scope of this note,
may arise, depending on the extent of the surety's participation in the contractor's securing
of the funds. This phase of the problem is discussed in ARANT, LAW OF Su,
Sr=sHn
AND
GUARxNTy (1931) 346 et seq.
24. Banker's Surety Co. v. Maxwell, 222 Fed. 797 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915) ; ARANT, op. cit.

supra note 24, at 345.
25. Id. at 351.

26. Columbia Digger Co. v. Rector, 215 Fed. 618 (W. D. Wash. 1914); Columbia Digger
Co. v. Sparks, 227 Fed. 780 (C. C. A. 9th, 19,5), (1916) 16 Co. L. REv. 358; Alexander
Lumber Co. v. Aetna Co., 296 Ill. 500, 129 N. E. 871 (1921), (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 766.
27. For a vigorous attack on so one-sided an approach to the problem, see Rudkin, 3.,
dissenting, Columbia Digger Co. v. Sparks, 227 Fed. 780, 786 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915).
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applied the funds to a different debt, is a normal reaction. Nevertheless, the
heavy majority of courts hold that the surety will not be discharged in the
situation where no knowledge is established."' It should be mentioned that it
is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether the court in a given case based its
decision on knowledge or the lack thereof, 29 while in other decisions there is no
such ambiguity. 30
Where there is knowledge of the source of the funds, the merits become
more evenly balanced; here the greatest analytical difficulty arises, and likewise
the sharpest conflict among the courts. Many jurisdictions adopt the rule that
a creditor with knowledge is bound to make such an application as will protect
the surety. 31 A contrary view is set out forcefully in a recent opinion by the
Wyoming Supreme Court, in State Bank of Wheatland v. Turpen,32 a decision
which introduces considerable clarity into the discussion. In that case a bank
lent money to the contractor to complete his work and later took an assignment
of the claims of the materialmen. Payment was made directly to the bank by
the state, the contractor assigning over his payments in advance. The bank
applied parts of the money to loans to the contractor made prior to taking the
assignments of the materialmen's claims, instead of discharging claims of the
materialmen for payment of which the defendant surety company was liable.
In a suit by the bank on these claims at a later date, the surety defended on
the grounds that there had been a misapplication. The court rejected this contention in a well-reasoned opinion containing an exhaustive review of the authorities. It was pointed out that the surety's business is one of risk and that it
was not fitting that an application once made in good faith should be nullified
in order to reduce the risk for which the surety was compensated in the first
place. By watchful conduct the surety could have protected its position by an
agreement with the contractor; having failed to take such precautionary measures, it would not be heard to contest the application as made. In upholding
an application of this type even where there was knowledge of the source, the
court specifically denied that any equity in favor of the surety, sufficient to compel
a reapplication of the payments, existed in the fund. However, it is to be noted
that the facts of the case present an unusually strong basis for denying the
28. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Butcher, 223 Ala. 6o6, 137 So. 446 (1931) ;
Chicago Lumber Co. v. Douglas, 89 Kan. 308, 131 Pac. 563 (1913) ; Salt Lake City v. O'Connor, 68 Utah 233, 249 Pac. 81o (1926),

(1927) 25 MicH. L. REv. 556.

The cases cited infra

note 36, upholding the creditor's application even where knowledge was shown, are of course
in support of this view. Additional support is found in the decisions upholding the application to accounts of other years of funds paid over by a tax collector, as against sureties on
his bond for the payment of tax moneys collected as of a certain year. Colerain v. Bell, 5o
Mass. 499 (845) ; see Chapman v. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt. 721, 749 (Va. 1875). For a further collection of cases on the problem see Notes (1922) 21 A. L. R. 704, 714, 725; (1927)
49 A. L. R. 952, 955; (1929) 6o A. L. R. 203, 205; L. R. A. 1917C 637.

29. Thus in Crane Co. v. Pacific Heat and Power Co., 36 Wash. 95, 78 Pac. 460 (i9o4),
a frequently-cited case, the surety's defense, to which a demurrer was entered, contained
allegations that the creditor knew the source of the funds, but the court, in holding the surety
discharged, made no mention of the fact of knowledge.
30. Sturtevant Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 92 Wash. 52, 158 Pac. 74o (1916), L. R. A.
19,7C 637.
31. United States v. American Bonding & Trust Co., 89 Fed. 925 (C. C. A. 4th, 1898);
U. S. v. Johnson, 67 F. (2d) 121 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933) ; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dupree,
223 Ala. 42o, 136 So. 822 (ig3i) ; see Standard Ins. Co. v. Duval Lumber Co., 99 Fla. 525,
531, 126 So. 643, 645 (193o). The cases cited snpra note 27, protecting the surety even without knowledge, are further in support of this view, as are many dicta in the cases holding
the other way because knowledge was shown. See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Butcher, 223 Ala. 6o6, 6o8, 137 So. 446, 447 (1931) ; Sturtevant Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,
92 Wash. 52. 59, 158 Pac. 740, 743 (i16).
32. 34 P. (2d) I (Wyo. 1934), aff'd, 37 P. (2d) 679 (Wyo. 1934).
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surety's claim: the surety had stood by and let the bank advance to the contractor
money without which the entire venture would have failed. "To say that under
such circumstances all the broad principles of equity are, as claimed, in favor of
the surety company, which, so far as the record shows, paid no attention to
whether or not the contractor was able to, or would carry out his contract, is,
we think, going somewhat too far." 33 The usual case involves more difficulty
in disposing of the surety's contentions. Nevertheless, many jurisdictions recognize the creditor's freedom of application even with knowledge,34 marking a
departure from the lien cases, where the great majority require the materialman
to apply the payments so as to protect the owner, when he has knowledge of the
source of the funds.35
Where the debtor has contracted with a third party-perhaps the suretyto appropriate the payments to certain obligations, knowledge of this duty should
fairly convey to the creditor the necessity for such application. It might be
thought that the failure on the part of the debtor and of the one to whom the
duty is owed to notify the creditor of their arrangement, should operate to their
disadvantage. However, if the creditor secures knowledge of the duty,36 even
from other sources, it seems proper to forbid an application which will prejudice
the one to whom the duty is owed and place the debtor in the position of committing a breach. Where the creditor knows of the duty, the Restatement of Contracts37 goes so far as to make the ineffective even a positive direction by the
debtor to apply the funds to debts other than those he is under a duty to discharge
first. 8
In this connection it is interesting to note a possible entrance of the legislative factor into the field. A duty imposed by statute would seem at least as
binding as one arising from a contract. There have been enacted a number of
statutes making it a criminal offence for the contractor to apply the money received from the owner otherwise than in discharge of claims of laborers and
materialmen, so long as such claims remain unsatisfied.39 Some of the statutes
expressly term the money a trust fund while in the hands of the contractor. 40
It would seem rather clear that the essential purpose in such a statute is to
guarantee the reimbursement of the laborers and materialmen, but it is surprising
to note that an incidental purpose of protecting the sureties has been detected
by the judicial eye. Thus it was said in the case of Stulz-Sickles Co. v. Fredburn
Const. Corp.:
33. Id. at ii.
34. People v. Powers, io8 Mich. 339, 66 N. W. 215 (1896) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Day,
16i Minn. 281, 201N . W. 410 (1924), (1925) 25 CoL L. REv. 679, (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv.
990, (1925) 9 MINN. L. Rrv. 391 ; Grover v. Board of Education, lo2 N. J. Eq. 415, 141 At.
81 (Ch. 1928). In Metropolitan Ins. Co. v. United Brick & Tile Co., 167 Okla. 402, 29 P.
(2d) 77, (934), the creditor had knowledge of the source of the funds, but not of a promise
by the contractor to appropriate the funds to satisfy the obligations in question. The court
upheld an application to other debts.
35. See note 12, supra.
36. This is not to be confused with the "knowledge of the source of the funds" to which
reference is made elsewhere; that type of knowledge does not necessarily indicate to the
creditor that application in any particular manner is required.
37. RESTATEMENT, CoNTeAcTs (1932) § 388.
38. Compare with note 4, supra.
39. N. Y. Lim LAW (Supp. 1934) §§ 36a, 36b; MiNN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8491; N.
D. ComP. LAws (Supp. 1926) §§ 9922a1, 9922a2. Such statutes are in force in roughly onethird of the states.
40. MicH. Coimip. LAWS (Supp. 1933) § 17115, 3ooh, 300i; N. J. Laws 1932, cC. 268-269;
STAT. WIs. (1931)

§ 289:025.
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"I think it is obvious that the purpose of that act . . . was to avoid,

so far as surety companies were concerned, the effect of the decision of this
court in Grover v. Board of Education of theTownship of Franklin .... "'
The Grover case 4 2 upheld as against the surety an application to other obligations
by a creditor with knowledge of the source of the funds. A widespread adoption
of the view expressed in the Stulz-Sickles Co. case seems, however, unlikely.
A more reasonable interpretation would be that the statute's purpose is satisfied
if the contractor pays to the materialmen the funds received from the owner,
regardless of their subsequent application.
There is critical support for the view that even knowledge of the source
3
Proof the funds should not compel an application favorable to the surety.
fessor Williston has pointed out that a third party selling an automobile to the
debtor for the money received under the contract, or even a donee of such money,
would not be answerable to the surety.4 4 Of course, those situations are somewhat distinguishable. In the former case the debtor has the car by way of a
substitute asset, which can, if need be, be reached by the creditor. Furthermore, to require a rescission of the purchase would impede the negotiability of
money, which is not the case when the creditor is allowed to keep it but required
to apply it on his books to other obligations. As for a gift of the money, this
will not be upheld if it is a fraud on creditors, and if it is not, there are necessarily enough assets to prevent harm to the surety.
It might be reasoned that since the materialman is under a duty to the owner
to apply the payments to the current obligation, in order to release the owner's
property from liens,45 a necessary legal consequence of this duty is the release
of the sureties on the current debts. However, the lien cases decide only that a
contrary application will not be effective against the owner in subsequent lien proceedings. The decisions cannot be construed as holding the application utterly
void, and where the suit is against the surety instead of the owner, the surety
must escape liability, if at all, by some less circuitous route.
As was said in Grover v. Board of Education,48 many of the cases
assume, without proving, that such an equity exists in favor of the surety." And
the opposing cases have given equally little elaboration of the question in assuming
that no such equity is to be found.4 7 In determining this phase of the controversy, there is little but ordinary business usage available in the way of guidance.
There may be a nebulous sort of propriety in making each transaction a unit
unto itself, with funds coming from the job cancelling debts incurred thereunder. But this prospect of pleasing symmetry may well be discarded in face
of the reality that "Most contractors and subcontractors must necessarily use
some of their money that they receive in payment of obligations, not incurred
in the particular contract from which their money is received." 48 It is, at the
least, not absolutely clear that the fact that there is a surety on the particular
41. 114 N. J. Eq. 475, 478, 169 Atl. 27, 29 (Ch. 1933).
42. 702 N. J.Eq. 415, 141 AtI. 81 (Ch. 1928).
43. 3 WIusoN, CONTRACTS (1922) § i8o6; see Note (1929) 27 MicH. L. REV. 686.
44. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1922) § i8o6.
45. Cases cited note 12, supra.
46. lO2 N. 3. Eq. 415, 417, 141 Atl. 81, 82 (Ch. 1928). See statutory sequel to this decision, supranote 40.
47. "This contention [of the surety] depends upon an alleged equity, that the money
earned shall be applied only upon the account for materials furnished for the particular job.
It is not supported by the letter of the bond or statute, and we think it is not supported by
authority." People v. Powers, io8 Mich. 339, 343, 66 N. W. 2,5, 216 (1896). The Wheatland Bank case, cited note 32, supra, is unique in that in the opinion the arguments on both
sides of the question are adequately considered.
48. Standard Oil Co. v. Day, 161 Minn. 281, 287, 201 N. W. 410, 412 (1924).
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job betokens to the ordinary man an obligation to apply the payments so as to
effect the surety's release. There may be sureties on the other obligations as well,
and in the absence of directions by the debtor, the feeling that the money should
be applicable to any of the debts is one not unlikely to be present.
It has also been suggested that to deny the effectiveness of such applications
would disrupt commercial affairs, giving to ordinary business transactions an
unwholesome instability.49 The previously discussed 50 possibilities of damage
to the creditor entailed in the release of security on the debts to which the funds
were applied and in the operation of the Statute of Limitations, are also important. While in the lien cases protection for the owner was advocated in the
absence of proof of serious harm to the materialman, a different rule might well
be adopted in the surety cases. With no party clearly at fault, the fact that the
surety has received compensation for undertaking the risk lessens the reluctance
to place on him the loss.
The American Law Institute has treated the problem under discussion. In
the Restatement of Contracts, it is stated that the materialman is under no duty to
apply the funds so as to protect the surety, even though he is aware of the source
from which the money is derived. 5 ' It is encouraging to observe the language
used in the Wheatland case relative to the above provision: "We think after
carefully weighing the arguments on all sides, that we should follow the Institute's view, if for no other reason than that of uniformity, which is of importance to sureties as well as to others." 52 This consideration appears to be highly
meritorious. A widespread adoption of the Restatement position would place on
sureties the burden of diligently following the -course of the transactions on
which their liabilities are based, and to secure themselves they would be required
(I) to obtain agreements with the contractors to apply the payments in the desired manner, and (2) to see that notice of such an arrangement was given the
materialmen. 2 Such a price is not too great for uniformity in a field where that
quality is peculiarly desirable.
L.M.G.
"DESERTION"

AS A GROUND FOR DIvORcE-The granting of an absolute

divorce on the ground of desertion is permissible in forty-five states; only the
District of Columbia, New York, North Carolina and South Carolina refuse
such a remedy.' Even these latter jurisdictions, with the exception of South
Carolina, permit some form of limited divorce or separation for desertion. The
statutes utilize various terms to describe desertion, some of the more common
being "wilful", "obstinate and continued", "malicious", "utter", and "obstinate." 2 As might be expected, few such definitions have met with unanimous
judicial approval. It can, however, be stated safely that the popular connotation
of the term-actual departure of one spouse from the other-is not its legal
49. Ibid.; see Note (1929) 27 MIcH. L. REv. 686, 689.
50. Supra p. 9oo.

51. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 387, Illus. IO. See id. § 394, Illus. 3,for a similar case involving application by the court; in that situation the surety is protected.
52. State Bank of Wheatland v. Turpen, 34 P. (2d) I, 16 (Wyo. 1934), cited note 32,
supra.

53. Such a warning, by giving the creditor knowledge of the duty on the contractor,
would protect the surety under the rule set out in § 388 of the Restatement, cited note 37,
supra.
I. II VERNR, AMERIcAN FAmILY LAWS (1932) § 67. The required period for desertion varies from one to five years: one year in twenty-one jurisdictions; two years in eleven;
three years in eleven; five years in one; not specified in two.
2. "Wilful desertion" is used in nineteen jurisdictions; "abandonment" in six; "wilfully
deserts and absents" in five; "wilful, obstinate and continued" in three. The other jurisdictions use various terms. II VERNMER, AmEiCAN FAMILY LAWS (1932)

§ 67.
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meaning. There may be desertion without actual separation, actual separation
without desertion. In view of the fact that desertion is the ground most frequently used for divorce,3 the meaning which has been judicially attached to the
term will bear inspection.
Desertion is generally defined as actual departure without sufficient cause
and with no intent to return.4 But not all these elements are necessary. There
may be desertion though the parties continue to reside under the same roof,
or conversely, there may be no desertion though the spouses have separated, as
where they continue to have sexual relations. 5 This situation is not so anomalous
as it may seem. Dissatisfaction with the marriage may become so overpowering that there is a refusal on the part of one spouse to continue sexual relations; the wife may continue to cook and wash, but conduct herself more as
housekeeper than wife. Courts have stressed the importance of sexual intercourse in the marital relationship, and such a refusal will constitute desertion
entitling the other spouse to a divorce. It has been aptly stated by Bishop thus:
. .. But if from no consideration of health and from no other good
reason, either the husband or the wife, permanently, totally, and irrevocably puts an end to what is lawful in marriage and unlawful in every other
relation, to what distinguishes marriage from every other relation, this by
the better opinion constitutes matrimonial desertion . . . " 6
It should be noted that the wife, as well as the husband, may secure a divorce on
this ground.7 This view of the marriage relation has found strong support. As
has been said by one court:
"Marriage is encouraged for reasons of public policy and morality and the
parties should not be held in an unnatural relation, repugnant to sex, and
promotive of adultery." S
Refusal to have intercourse is, however, the only ground discovered on which
a divorce has been granted for desertion while both parties continue to reside
under the same roof.
The emphasis placed upon physical relations may be further illustrated.
A husband with a physical defect preventing the act may be divorced by his
wife if the defect can safely be remedied. The court so deciding stated:
". .. a marriage never consummated despite the dissent of one of the
spouses is desertion . . . the deserting mind of the husband has ever con-

tinued unabating, the desertion was ever direct and actual, and the mere
local habitation of the wife previous to the cure appears to be of no legal
concern whatever. There is nothing necessarily constructive about the desertion." 9
Further evidence of the emphasis is shown by a holding that refusal of a spouse
to appear before physicians for examination to determine capability to have in3. JACOBS, CASES AND MATERIAL ON Dom[EsTIc RELATIONS (1933) 899.
4. SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION & DOMESTIC RELATIONS (6th ed. i92i)
§ 1615; KEEzER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (2d ed. 1923) § 326.
5. lit re Arnout's Estate, 283 Pa. 49, 128 Atl. 661 (925).
6. BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION (1891) § 1676.
7. Tupper v. Tupper, 147 Atl. 633 (N. J. Eq. 1929) (suit against the husband) ; Swartz
v. Swartz, lO5 N. J. Eq. 168, 147 At. 330 (1929) (suit against the wife).
8. Raymond v. Raymond, 79 Atl. 430, 431 (N. J. Ch. 19o9). Cf. Evans v. Evans, 247 Ky.
I, 56 S. W. (2d) 547 (1933) ; Fries v. Fries, 166 Md. 6o4, 171 Ati. 703 (1934). NELSON,
DIVORCE AND SEPARATION (1895) § 71, states: "In our age and country marriage is encouraged for the propagation of the race and the nurture and education of children in the home,
as well as to prevent licentiousness, and the state has no active interest in preserving a marriage where these ends and purposes are defeated."
9. Yawger v. Yawger, 86 AtI. 419, 420 (N. J. Eq. 1913).
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tercourse, is conduct corroborative of the charge of refusal to have intercourse,
and is material evidence in a divorce proceeding.'0
In three states, statutory law has strengthened the views so expressed.,
In others, where the legislators have not spelled out the grounds for divorce so
carefully, the courts have reached similar results by construing "abandonment"
to mean ceasing to live together as man and wife.' 2 In line with the tendency
to place great weight on the importance of intercourse to successful marital relations, many statutes have made impotency a cause for divorce.'3 In some states
this rule presents an anomalous situation. Under the statutes, a spouse may be
divorced even if perfectly willing to have intercourse, though, because of a
physical defect, it is impossible; and yet, as will subsequently be seen, there may
be no divorce available when a spouse with no physical deterrent remains aloof
through unwillingness. 4 Such a distinction has been soundly criticized:
"What is the difference to the husband whether the wife cannot or will not
assent to marital intercourse? If a divorce lies in the first case [for impotency], a fortiori should it in the latter, where the case presents an inexcusable and long-continued refusal . . ."15

Particularly striking is the fact that some decisions show departures from
oft-stated definitions of desertion, because the presence of refusal to have intercourse has outweighed the absence of other, supposedly required, elements. Thus
some text writers have stated that desertion does not mean ceasing to have sexual
intercourse, but requires a cessation of habitation, intention in the mind of the
deserter not to resume cohabitation, and absence of the other party's consent to
the separation; this is the commonly accepted view of desertion.'" In one case,
however, a divorce was granted the wife even though the husband, in compelling
her to keep to a separate room, stated explicitly that he intended to resume rela-7
tions with her when she had been sufficiently punished for an indiscretion.'
There are other instances where a spouse has been held guilty of desertion, in contravention of the dogma, when the refusal to permit intercourse was not accompanied by convincing evidence of an intent to persist in the refusal.' 8
There is, nevertheless, an opposite view. Some courts require more than
refusal to have intercourse to satisfy the definition of desertion. In a leading
Massachusetts case, the court, in refusing to grant a divorce, said:
"The word desertion in the statute does not signify merely a refusal of
matrimonial intercourse, which would be a breach or violation of a single
conjugal or marital duty or obligation only, but it imports a cessation of coio. Becker v. Becker, 113 N. J.Eq. 286, 166 Atl. 489 (Ch. 1933).
CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1931) §§ 92, 95-1o4, io7; N. D. ComP. LAWS (1913)
§§ 4380, 4383; S. D. Comp. LAws (929) §§ 137, 140, 143.
12. Axton v. Axton, 182 Ky. 286, 206 S. W. 480 (1918) ; Fleegle v. Fleegle, 136 Md. 630,
Iio Atl. 889 (192o). Cotra: Risk v. Risk, 2o2 App. Div. 299, 195 N. Y. Supp. 536 (ist
Dep't 1922).
13. II VERNiER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1932) § 68. It is not a ground for divorce in
California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, or West Virginia.
14. This situation can arise in Florida, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Minnesota, Nevada, and Pennsylvania.
15. See Stewart v. Stewart, 78 Me. 548, 553, 7 Atl. 473, 475 (1887).
I6. KEEzER, MARnaAGE AND DivoRCE (2d ed. 1923) § 326.
17. Ringgold v. Ringgold, 128 Va. 485, 1O4 S.E. 836 (192o).
I8. Swartz v. Swartz, io5 N. J.Eq. 168, 147 AtI. 330 (Ch. 1929). In Ogilvie v. Ogilii.

vie, 37 Ore. 171, 61 Pac. 627 (igoo), the wife said she believed cohabitation might be proper

sometime in the future. This was held not to show a desire on her part for a resumption of

the marital status.
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habitation, a refusal to live together, which involves an abnegation of all the
duties and obligations resulting from the marriage contract." "o
While this language has been adopted in Maine, 20 the Massachusetts position is
clarified by a holding that a husband who had refused to21dwell with his wife
but had continued to support her, was guilty of desertion.
In other states which follow a similar view, the decisions are explicable by
the restrictive wording of the statutes. Thus where it is required that the spouse
"absent himself", actual departure is required. 22 There are, however, some
jurisdictions which lend support to the Maine and Massachusetts view without
refusal to
statutory assistance.23 A middle view is represented by decisions that
have intercourse, not in itself sufficient to constitute desertion, 24 may, when
the parties
coupled with default in other
25 marital duties, be enough, even though
live under a common roof.
An important qualification must be noted. Where the poor physical condition (to be distinguished from an inherent defect preventing intercourse) of
26
the refusing spouse is the basis for the refusal, grounds for divorce are lacking.
imof
the
view
Bishop's
adopting
jurisdictions
in
even
This is fully recognized
27
portance of intercourse in the marital relation.
Inspection of the statutes affords little aid in defining the term "desertion." California, North Dakota, and South Dakota specifically label the refusal
to have intercourse as desertion,2 but the only other help is gained from those
29
which more clearly require that one spouse "absent himself" from the other.
The other statutes have given rise to conflicting decisions under identical wording. Florida cases do not support the view that refusal to have intercourse will
2
alone constitute desertion, 0 while those from Mississippi and New Jersey do. '
32
Oregon
Similarly,
The wording of the three statutes on the point is the same.
and Nevada both have statutory requirements of "wilful desertion", 33 which is5
satisfied by a refusal of intercourse in the former state 34 but not in the latter.
In Colorado, such refusal suffices to36 fulfill the statutory requiiement that one
spouse "wilfully desert" the other, while in Illinois the opposite result is
1g. Southwick v. Southwick, 97 Mass. 327, 328 (1867).
Stewart v. Stewart, 78 Me. 548, 552, 7 Ati. 473, 474 (1887), where the court said:
"Sexual intercourse is only one marital right or duty. There are many other important
rights or duties. . . . The obligations the parties assume to each other, and to society, are
not dependent on this single one." See ME. REv. STAT. (1930) C.73, § 2.
21. Magrath v. Magrath, 103 Mass. 577 (i87o). See BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVoRcE AND
SEPARATION (6th ed. 1881) § 778a; Raymond v. Raymond, 79 Atl. 430 (N. J.Eq. :9o9).
22. Fritz v. Fritz, 138 Ill. 436, 28 N. E. o58 (i89i) ; Lambert v. Lambert, 165 Iowa 367,
145 N. W. 920 (1914) ; Gruner v. Gruner, 183 Mo. App. 157, 165 S. W. 865 (1914) ; Wacker
20.

v. Wacker, 55 Pa. Super. 380 (93).
23. Underwood v. Underwood, 5o App. D. C. 323 (192I) ; Prall v. Prall, 58 Fla. 496, 50
So. 867 (I9O9); Segelbaum v. Segelbaum, 39 Minn. 258, 39 N. W. 492 (1888); Wills v.
Wills, 74 W. Va. 709, 82 S. E. 1092 (914).
24. Albert v. Albert, 137 Va. I,iig S. E. 6: (1923).
25. Chandler v. Chandler, 132 Va. 418, 112 S.E. 856 (1922).
26. Bishop v. Bishop, 133 Wash. 522, 233 Pac. 918 (1925).
27. Supra note 6.

28. Supra note ii.
29. IOWA CODE (:927) §§ 10475-10476; PA. STAT. ANN. (Pardon, 1931)
This is held to require actual physical departure. See supra note 22.

tit. 23,

§ 10.

3o. Prall v. Prall, 58 Fla. 496, 50 So. 867 (1909).
31. Graves v. Graves, 88 Miss. 677 (i9O6); Raymond v. Raymond, 79 Atl. 43o (N. J.

Eq. i9og).
FLA.
32. The former's statute requires "wilful, obstinate and continued desertion".
ComP. LAWS (1927) § 4983. Those of the latter two states require "wilful, continued and
obstinate" desertion. N. J. COMP. STAT. (:9:0) 2023, § 30; MISS. CODE ANN. (:930) § 1414.
33. ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 6 (9o7) ; NEV. CoMP. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 946o.
34- Baker v. Baker, 99 Ore. 213, 195 Pac. 347 (92).
35. Black v. Black, 48 Nev. 220, 228 Pac. 889 (1924).
36. CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 2240; Stein v. Stein, 5 Colo. 55 (:879).
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reached 37 under a statute requiring that the abandoning spouse have "wilfully
deserted or absented." 38 Since the terms in the latter purport to be distinguishable, it would seem that "desert" should mean something less than actual departure.
Granting the policy of the law to be that marriages should be kept intact
wherever possible, there is much to be said for the stand taken by Bishop. The
state can be little served by a marriage which results in eternal strife and the
thrusting of a spouse in a relation conducive to adultery. It is far better that
such a marriage be dissolved.
Turning to the question of what conditions will justify one spouse in leaving the other, a similarly muddled situation appears. The rule has frequently
been stated that desertion will be justified by such conduct on the part of the
other spouse as would entitle the one leaving to a divorce.3 9 Others have stated
that lesser misconduct will suffice. 40 The interests of society in preserving the
marital status are invoked to support the former rule. That theory has been
succinctly stated as follows:
"If the parties to a marriage contract were allowed to renounce the ties of
wedlock and to abandon the duties and obligations of the conjugal relationship for any cause that seemed reasonable and just to them, or for any
cause other than the legal cause for divorce, then indeed would such contract have little binding force, and the sanctity of the marital state would
be destroyed . . . Hence the interests of society, the happiness of the par-

ties, and the welfare of families demand the rule." 41
It is difficult to question the soundness of this reasoning. To allow one spouse
to leave another for a flimsy pretext is certainly contrary to any sound policy.
"It would be impossible to maintain the peace of families if every quarrel should
lead to a divorce. Married parties must bear and forbear." -' Accordingly, it
takes more than a harsh word 43 or a badly cooked meal 44 to justify a husband's
departure. That the wife desires to talk far into the night and so disturb her
husband's rest is not a legally sufficient cause for him to desert the marriage
bed. "She may continue to talk more than wisdom dictates, but divorce cannot be made the panacea for the infelicities of married life." 45 Other such instances are plentiful. 46 On the other hand, it is hard to conceive of an attitude
which permits married life to be made unbearable and yet prevents the unfortunate spouse from leaving without being guilty of desertion.
The results of such a situation present a perplexing problem to anyone
seeking uniformity in the law. Since divorce statutes are notoriously lacking
37. Fritz v. Fritz, 138 Ill. 436, 28 N. E. O58 (1891).
38. ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 40, § I.
39. NELSON, DIVORCE (1895) § 95; ScHoiLE, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION &
DOMESTIC RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921) § 1645; Arnaboldi v. Arnaboldi, ioi N. J. Eq. 126, 138

Atl. 116 (Ch.

1927).

4o. Lyster v. Lyster, iii Mass. 327 (1873).
41. Warfield v. Warfield, 97 Ark. 125, 133 S. W. 6o6, 6o7 (igio).
42. Gillinwaters v. Gillinwaters, 28 Mo. 6o, 61 (,859).
43. Wald v. Wald, 161 Md. 493, 159 Atl. 97 (1932).
44. Young v. Young, 94 N. J. Eq. 155, i19 Atl. 92 (1922).
45. Pfannebacker v. Pfannebacker, 133 Iowa 425, i1O N. W. 618 (19o7).
(wife refused to live with
46. Kendrick v. Kendrick, 173 Ga. 434, i6o S. E. 5o2 (93)
mother-in-law) ; Hague v. Hague, 84 N. J. Eq. 674, 95 Atl. 192 (Ch. 1935) (husband drank
and was inattentive to wife) ; Knibb v. Knibb, 94 N. J. Eq. 747, 121 Atl. 715 (1923) (husband refused to have a religious marriage after a civil one) ; Paxton v. Paxton, 98 N. J. Eq.
476, 131 Atl. 386 (1925) (husband shiftless and unable to support wife). Cases which hold
that the wife may justifiably leave her husband: Crouch v. Crouch, 15o Md. 6o8, 133 Atl. 725
(1926) (husband kept lunatic brother in house) ; Taylor v. Taylor, 177 Minn. 428, 225 N.
W. 287 (1929) (husband could not support wife).
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in similarity, 47 there is a like dissimilarity in decisions. The nature of the conduct which will permit the offended spouse to leave the other and bar the other's
getting a divorce for desertion, varies from state to state. This is true not only
of the jurisdictions in which cause for departure is synonymous with cause for
divorce, but also of those which approach the problems independently. In the
latter states, the differences are attributable to varying degrees of judicial willingness to compel a continuation of domestic disorder. The attitude favoring
a less strict view has been well stated:
"But it seems to us that any rule which will permit the husband to enter
upon a course of conduct toward his wife which is humiliating, insulting
and degrading, and thereby drive her from him . . . and claim a divorce

on the ground of her desertion, if his misconduct does not legally entitle
her to one, tends directly to the degradation of womanhood, and enables
him to take advantage of his own wrong."1 48
Similarly well reasoned opinions have followed this view, holding that it is sufficient if the party withdrawing from the cohabitation has reasonable cause for
believing, and does honestly believe, that by reason of the misconduct of the
other the status cannot longer be maintained with health, safety, or self-respect.49
The question of whether the misconduct causing the separation is sufficient for
the offended spouse to obtain a divorce is regarded as immaterial.
The fear that homes may be disrupted on slight provocation has in fact
not materialized in the states adopting the other approach. Courts have not
upheld as justification every triviality. The motivation has rather been the
health, safety, or self-respect of the offended spouse 50 Thus the wife is justified in leaving the husband when he has fits and suffers from a congenital disease,
although such defections would not be grounds for divorce.5 1 Such a reason
for quitting the home is not capricious. As the court so deciding stated:
"A man by a course bordering on cruelty, yet keeping barely inside the
dividing line of the statutory cause for divorce, may impel his wife to seek
peace and health by fleeing from his home, and then get rid of her entirely
by alleging her desertion." 52
A striking example of the undesirable results dictated by the narrow approach is
the situation wherein the husband transmits a venereal disease to the wife. It
has been held in a jurisdiction following the broader view that the wife is justified in leaving.5 3 Yet only one state 54 allows a divorce on this ground, and
in many jurisdictions the wife would be compelled to continue living with the
husband, humiliated by the knowledge that the disease was contracted elsewhere.
It should be noted in this connection that it is quite possible to get substantially similar results under conflicting dogmas. Thus, in a state which requires
adequate grounds for divorce to enable one spouse to leave the other, lax di47. See 8 FoRTuNE (April 1934) IO2-IO3 for a complete chart of the grounds for
divorce.
48. Stocking v. Stocking, 76 Minn. 292, 294, 79 N. W. 172, 173 (899).
49. See cases mtpra note 46.
5o. Lyster v. Lyster, iii Mass. 327 (1873) ; Tarrant v. Tarrant, 156 Mo. App. 725, 138
S. W. 44 (1911) (husband a drunkard, cruel to wife); Cornish v. Cornish, 23 N. J. Eq. 2o8
(Ch. 1872) (husband provoked wife into leaving) ; Musgrave v. Musgrave, 185 Pa. 26o, 39
Atl. 961 (1898) (husband compelled wife to live on a farm apart from him).
51. Neff v. Neff, 20 Mo. App. 182 (1886).
52. Id. at 192.
53. Rice v. Rice, 231 Mich. 614, 2o4 N. W. 758 (1925) ; Daeters v. Daeters, 38 Atl. 950
(N. 3. Ch. 1897); Dowling v. Dowling, 91 N. J. Eq. 464, Iio Atl. 39 (Ch. 192o) ; Danielly
v. Danielly, 93 N. J. Eq. 556, x18 Atl. 335 (Ch. 1922).
54. ILL. Ray. STAT. (Cahill, I923) c. 40, § I.

NOTES

vorce laws might lead to results quite as liberal as those obtained in states purporting to treat the problems independently but nevertheless imposing rather
stringent requirements for justifiable departure.
In some instances, the courts have carried the liberal approach to unwarranted extremes. Not only has the wife been allowed to leave and to resist an
action for divorce, but she has been permitted to consider the stranded spouse
as a constructive deserter and sue him for divorce on that ground.55 While
this is perhaps a logical extension from the other cases, it opens the way to a
circumvention of the divorce laws. For example, in a state where cruelty is
grounds only for a divorce from bed and board, the wife may utilize the cruelty
as a grounds for leaving the husband, and then, after the statutory period has
run, secure her divorce on grounds of desertion.5 6 In effect, this makes cruelty
a ground for divorce by judicial sanction. Such changes in the divorce law,
even if desirable, might better be left to the legislatures.
A qualification on the strict view is found in the rule that the period during
which a divorce suit is pending will not be counted as part of the period for
desertion, even though it turns out that there were insufficient grounds for divorce.57 The suit must, however, be brought promptly and in good faith.58 Furthermore, the deserted spouse must ordinarily make efforts to recall the deserter
lest the desertion be justified on the grounds of consent. 59 Greater efforts at
such reconciliation are required of a husband than of a wife.60 If an offer to
return is made in good faith and before the period for desertion has elapsed, the
refusal of the deserted spouse to take back the other will not only excuse the
original deserter, but will make the one refusing guilty of desertion. 61
Assuming the desertion to be unjustified, interesting problems are presented
as to circumstances preventing the spouse from returning within the period
allowed for repentance. In case the deserting spouse becomes insane before the
statutory period has elapsed, the great weight of authority bars the divorce suit
of the deserted spouse. 62 The theory is that the desertion must continue as
wilful or intentional for the full period, and an insane person cannot have such
an intention. There is also pointed out the possibility that if the power of reason
is retained, the deserter may repent and return. 63 This view is taken even where
there are statutes making ground for divorce the fact of living apart without
cohabitation for five consecutive years; the statute is construed as referring to
conscious acts of the parties. 64 One court has taken an opposite view and held
insanity to be no defense. 65 That decision, however, hinged upon a peculiar
statutory interpretation. It was required that the husband "wilfully desert his
wife; and absent himself without a reasonable cause for the space of two years."
The court construed the "reasonable cause" provision as applying to the desertion
and not to the absence. In any event, it is clear that the insanity of the deserter
55. Roberts v. Roberts, io8 W. Va. 71, 15o S. E. 231 (1929) (wife was accused of
adultery; there was jealousy and berating, but not sufficient for a divorce). See (193o) 28
MICH. L. REv. 623.

56. NEE.sox, DivoRcE (1895) § 94.
57. Barbour v. Barbour, 94 N. J. Eq. 7, 118 Atl. 778 (Ch. 1922) ; Sperling v. Sperling,
82 Pa. Super. 308 (1923) ; Vickers v. Vickers, 95 W. Va. 323, 122 S. E. 279 (1924).
58. Cooper v. Cooper, 92 Mont. 57, IO P. (2d) 939 (1932).
59. Sheeran v. Sheeran, 115 N. J. Eq. 75, 169 Atl. 871 (1934).
App. 357 (1892); McKinney v. McKinney, 77 W.
6o. Millowitsch v. Mlillowitsch, 44 Ill.
Va. 58, 87 S. E. 928 (igi6).
61. Whelan v. Whelan, 183 Pa. 293, 38 Atl. 625 (1897) ; Tutwiler v. Tutwiler, 118 Va.
724, 88 S. E. 86 (ii6).
62. Harrigan v. Harrigan, 135 Cal. 397, 67 Pac. 5o6 (19o2) ; Wright v. Wright, 125 Va.
526, 99 S. E. 515 (1919); Note (1919) 4 A. L. R. 1333.

63. Blandy v. Blandy, 2o App. D. C. 535 (1902).
Neb. 627, 116 N. W. 499 (9o8).
64. Messick v. Messick, 177 Ky. 337, 197 S. W.

65. Douglass v. Douglass, 31 Iowa 421 (1871).

See Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 81

792 (1917).
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will be no defense to a divorce suit if the statutory period has run before the
incapacity sets in. 6° The principal objection to the majority holding is that the
deserter is given undue consideration. His conduct merits no solicitude, yet the
deserted spouse is deprived, through no fault of her own, of the right to a divorce. This is particularly unfortunate in view of the status of the divorce
laws as regards insanity. Only seventeen states permit a divorce for insanity
in any case. Moreover, eleven of the seventeen require that the insanity last for
five years.6 7 In contrast, most of the statutes require but two or three years as
the period for desertion; in only one state is it five. 68 Thus in most states the
insanity leaves the deserted spouse in a situation from which extrication is impossible, and in the others the period before the decree can be secured is measurably extended.
Another situation of this sort arises when the deserting spouse is committed
to jail. Where the imprisonment constitutes the beginning of the separation,
the general holding is that there is no desertion. 69 The law is regarded as contemplating voluntary, not involuntary, separation. Comparison is drawn with
the insanity cases, where there is a similar lack of intent to desert. There is a
contrary view which stresses the fact that the imprisoned spouse was not altogether blameless for his misfortune. 70 Such a holding properly rejects analogies
to insanity cases in which the deserting spouse was in no way responsible. The
latter view becomes even more persuasive in the case of imprisonment after the
desertion has started, but before the statutory period has run. The absence has
in such a case been voluntarily undertaken, and there is even less reason for
penalizing the deserted spouse. One court has gone so far as to describe the
deserter's conduct as a waiver of the right to return.7 1 An interesting variation
appeared in a case where the deserter was drafted into the army shortly after
leaving his wife. Although separated from his wife through compulsory restraint due to no fault of his own, sufficient evidence of his intent never to return
2
to the wife was gathered, so as to give the wife a divorce for desertion.7
Many of the difficulties encountered in this field might be resolved by the
adoption of a uniform divorce law such as that now proposed.7 3 This is particularly desirable in view of the confused state of the law on the sufficiency of
the cause for a spouse's departure from the common home. Until the controversy can be smoothed over in some such fashion, the desire of the courts to
maintain the marital status wherever an intimate survey of the facts of the
particular case so recommends, must continue to be the governing factor.
M.N.N.
66. Porter v. Porter, 82 N. J. Eq. 400, 89 At. 25, (Ch. 1913) ; Fisher v. Fisher, 54 W.
Va. 146, 46 S. E. I18 (1903). But it has been held that the two year period contemplated by
the statute is that immediately preceding the filing of the petition, and that a cause of action
based on desertion is lost when the petition is not filed before the party becomes insane.
67. II VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws (1932) § 72.
68. Supra note I.
69. Truman v. Truman, 171 Atl. 435 (Del. 1934) ; Sitterson v. Sitterson, I9i N. C. 319,
131 S. E. 641 (1926).

7o. Davis v. Davis, 1o2 Ky. 440, 43 S. W. 168 (897).
71. Heiter v. Heiter, 21 Pa. Dist. Rep. 327 (igii). The court here said that the commission of a crime with full realization of the penalties if captured might well show an absence of any intent to return to the deserted spouse. See 9 R. C. L. § 146.
72. Margulies v. Margulies, 92 N. J. Eq. 332, 112 Atl. 484 (Ch. I92o) (a statute justifying the decision was not stressed by the court).
73. See the UNIFORM DESERTION AND NONSUPPORT ACT,
132.
DivoCRc JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U. L. A. (932)
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